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“The Battle-Fortune of Marshal
Hindenburg is not Bound up with
the Possession of a Hill”
The Germans and Vimy Ridge, April 1917
holg e r h e rw ig
Abstract : On 9 April 1917 four Canadian divisions and one British division
of 170,000 men broke through the “Vimy Group” of German Sixth Army
of some 40,000 men. By late afternoon, the Germans had been driven off
the Ridge. That day, as Brigadier-General Alexander Ross famously put
it, constituted “the birth of a nation.” Rivers on ink have been spilled
in the Canadians’ actions that day, but little attention has been paid to
“the other side of the hill.” Which German units defended the Ridge?
What was the quality of their leadership? Why did the defence collapse
so quickly? Why did the German soldiers not break and run? And how
were they able to prevent a deeper British-Canadian breakthrough? On
the basis of German sources, this article seeks to provide answers to
those questions.

T

100 th anniversary of the Battle of Vimy Ridge is
almost upon us. Canada’s most celebrated military victory—
spectacularly immortalized in the massive limestone memorial on
Hill 145 at Vimy Ridge—has taken on mythological proportions
ever since Brigadier-General Alexander Ross famously stated that
the battle constituted nothing less than “the birth of a nation.”1
Historians have seen it as the coming of age of the young nation, as
he

   Daria Coneghan, “Ross, Alexander (1880-1973),” The Encyclopedia
Saskatchewan, in esask.uregina.ca.html, accessed on 4 June 2016.
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its first bold step to emerge from out of Britain’s shadow. And since
the battle took place on Easter Monday, contemporary Canadian
“poets of every stripe” linked it to the “resurrection of Christ”; and
from there it was, in the words of the historian Jonathan Vance, only
a small step to connect Vimy with “the birth of a nation.”2 It is not
my goal either to uphold or to challenge that assertion, but rather
to offer what all too often is missing in Canadian accounts of Vimy:
“the other side of the hill.”3 For as Carl von Clausewitz succinctly put
it almost 200 year ago, “War . . . is not the action of a living force
upon a lifeless mass . . . but always the collision of two living forces.”4
First, the Great War needs to be set into some geographical and
demographical context from the German perspective. One tends to
view the German Empire of 1914 as a gigantic juggernaut of power,
land, men, and money. But at about 557,000 square kilometres it
was roughly 100,000 square kilometres smaller than Alberta. Its
opponents—even before the United States entered the conflict—
controlled a land mass of some 78 million square kilometres. And in
terms of population, while the Reich’s 67 million certainly outranked
that of Canada (under 8 million), it was paltry compared with the
aggregate population of its three main adversaries, Britain, France,
Russia and their empires: 760 million.
These raw figures made clear even to a layman before 1914 that
any future war for Germany (and its moribund ally, Austria-Hungary)
would have to be short and decisive (read, the Schlieffen Plan).5 A
war of attrition was not Germany’s trump suit. Despite countless
peacetime war games that stressed mixed-arms and group tactics,
flexibility and maneuver, the Imperial German Army, constituted
as such only on 4 August 1914, advanced in traditional fashion:
shoulder-to-shoulder in massed waves of gray-clad infantry. The result
was not surprising: 143,000 battle deaths in 1914; the figure rose to
628,000 by 1915 and then to 964,000 by 1917. Again, simply by way
   Jonathan Vance, “Battle Verse: Poetry and Nationalism after Vimy Ridge,” in
Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment, ed. by Geofrrey Hayes, Andrew Iarocci, and
Mike Bechtold (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 265-66.
3
   An exception is Andrew Godefroy, “The German Army at Vimy Ridge,” in Vimy
Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment, 225-38.
4
   Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.
5
   For a superb recent analysis, see The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives
on the German Strategy for World War I, ed. by Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans,
and Gerhard P. Gross (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014).
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Vimy Ridge. [Map by Mike Bechthold, © 2006 Canadian Military History]

of comparison: there were roughly 60,000 Canadian fatal casualties
between 1914 and 1920. German military historians have calculated
that units on average lost roughly one-third of their combat strength
every year. After the twin attrition battles of Verdun and the Somme
in 1916, the German Army of 1914 no longer existed. Its best noncommissioned officers had died; college graduates, quickly promoted
to the rank of second lieutenant, had taken their place. Replacements
basically meant convalescents. And Reserves. So it was at Vimy.
◆

◆

◆

◆

In terms of German strategy on the Western Front, Vimy Ridge
played almost no role. The new Third Supreme Army Command
(Oberste Heeresleitung, or ohl ) of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg
and General Erich Ludendorff had taken stock of the dire military
situation at the end of 1916 and decided that the Empire could spare
neither men nor guns in 1917; the tank was empty. Some 350,000
soldiers had been killed in 1916, and another 1.4 million wounded.
Hospitals were strained to the limit with 3 million casualties. Roughly
130,000 men had been “combed” out of rear echelon industrial
and administrative posts for service at the front, and the 310,000
men born in 1889 had already been called to the colours ahead of
schedule. Thus, when Colonel-General Ludwig von Falkenhausen,
commanding Sixth Army near Arras, suggested an attack against

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2016
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the British-Canadian lines around Souchez, Ludendorff vetoed the
plan.6 The German armies would spend the coming year in defensive
positions, consolidating and recovering from the battles of the Somme
and Verdun (almost half a million casualties each), and training in
the new defensive doctrines being formulated by Bavarian Captain
Hermann Geyer and Lieutenant-Colonel Max Bauer (more on this
later), leaving the hoped-for victorious offensive to the Navy and its
U-boats. The land forces were to be reconstituted and “modernized”
for a decisive campaign in 1918. For the time being, all resources,
including half a million military, civilian and pow labourers, toiled
to straighten out a 20-mile bulge in the so-called “Ancre knee,”
a line running from Lens to Reims via Royon. Dubbed Operation
Alberich after the malicious king of the dwarves in the ancient
Germanic Nibelungen saga, it was an audacious gamble.7 Ludendorff
surrendered 2,600 square kilometres of hard-won French territory.
Therein, he laid waste to every village, street, creek, tree, well, and
rail line—or, at least those left undestroyed by the 1916 Somme
battles. And in the war’s greatest feat of engineering, he deployed
1,250 supply trains of forty freight cars each to haul concrete and
steel for the construction of five major defensive lines, collectively
called the Siegfried Stellung (Hindenburg Line to the Allies).
It was an open secret that the Entente at a meeting in Chantilly
on 16 November 1916 had laid down a comprehensive, coordinated
land strategy for 1917: while Russia mounted a “large-scale action”
against Bulgaria, Britain and France would launch a “grand-style
attack” in the West.8 Sound on paper, the plan never materialized.
On 12 March 1917 Prince George Lvov led a Cabinet revolt against
Tsar Nicholas II, who was removed from power in favour of his
brother, Grand Duke Michael. Furthermore, General N. V. Ruzsky,
commander of the Northern Front, reported that his soldiers were in
open revolt and that his army had been reduced to a “militia.” Still,
at London on 16 January 1917 the Allies pressed on with their plans

   Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-1918, (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried
Mittler und Sohn, 1919), 332.
7
   For a brief description see Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and
Austria-Hungary 1914-1918, (London, New Delhi, New York, Sydney: Bloomsbury,
2014), 247-48.
8
   The texts of both meetings are in History of the Great War: Military Operations,
France and Belgium, 1917, Appendices, (London: Imperial War Museum, 1992), 1-3,
16-17.
6
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for a “powerful offensive” on the Western Front, for they had found
a new star in French General Georges Robert Nivelle—he did speak
English, after all.
Nivelle, the hero of the recapture of Fort Douaumont at Verdun
in 1916, had no doubts as to his ability to end the war quickly.
“Objective: Total destruction of active enemy forces by maneuver
and battle.”9 To accomplish that, Nivelle proposed a two-pronged
offensive in the West: the French with fifty-two divisions and 4,800
guns, and “without chance of failure,” would storm the southern
Aisne sector in the Champagne, to which the Germans had just
laid waste in Operation Alberich. Meanwhile, the British with fifteen
divisions and 2,800 guns would stage diversionary offensives around
Arras, between Vimy and Bullecourt, to prevent the Germans from
reinforcing the Champagne sector. Not surprisingly, then, in German
documents of the time and in subsequent histories, the Entente spring
offensives of 1917 are always referred to as “the twin battles of Arras
and the Champagne.” Nivelle assured politicians and commanders
alike that after an assault of no more than forty-eight hours, his
combat troops would have ripped through (percée) the German Aisne
front in depth; his Reserves would have exploited that yawning gap
to mop up German batteries and supply depots; and thereafter the
French Army would have broken out into open warfare.10
To be sure, there were doubters in the Allied camp. Field Marshal
Douglas Haig had no desire to launch yet another prolonged battle;
his true aim was to shift the bulk of his forces to Flanders, and to
drive toward Ostend and Zeebrugge, in the process capturing the
Belgian coast and reducing the German U-boat menace. General
Alfred Micheler, commander of Reserve Army Group and the man
Nivelle had chosen to command the major assault on the Aisne, like
Haig feared another prolonged battle. He doubted the likelihood of
a breakthrough, given that the Germans had withdrawn significant
forces from the Noyon salient to buttress their position on the
Aisne. General Henri-Philippe Pétain, commanding Central Army
Group and brutally honest as ever, rejected Nivelle’s certainty that
the artillery could destroy the enemy throughout a deep defensive

   Cited in Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in
the Great War (Cambridge MA, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2005), 325.
10
   See ibid., 324-25.
9
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General Ludwig von Falkenhausen, the new Governor-General of Belgium (second from the
left), on board refloated steamer Gneisenau off Antwerp, June 1917. [© IWM (Q 23992)]

position, and he feared that Nivelle was attacking on too broad a
front in the Champagne. He instead favoured a strategy of limited
gains. “Even the waters of Lake Geneva,” he lectured Minister of
War Paul Painlevé, “would have but little effect if dispersed over
the length and breadth of the Sahara Desert.”11 All to no avail. The
politicians in London (Prime Minister David Lloyd George) and in
Paris (Premier Alexandre Ribot) had faith in Nivelle. On 9 April
1917 Haig launched the Battle of Arras—a week before Nivelle struck
on the Aisne. And three days after the United States had entered
the war, largely as a result of Germany’s renewal of unrestricted
submarine warfare.
What of the two opposing armies at Vimy? Of Field Marshal
Haig’s British Expeditionary Force, two armies are of particular
interest to the student of Vimy Ridge. Just east of Arras were
positioned the 350,000 men of Sir Edmund Allenby’s Third Army,
and directly on and slightly west of Vimy Ridge stood LieutenantGeneral Sir Henry Horne’s First Army of 320,000 men and 1,100
artillery pieces. As is well known, First Army included LieutenantGeneral Sir Julian Byng’s Canadian Corps, composed of one British

   Cited in E. L. Spears, Prelude to Victory (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939), 346.

11
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Lt.-Gen. Sir Julian Byng, G.O.C. Canadians, May 1917. [Library and Archives Canada PA-001284]

and four Canadian divisions, with an amazing nominal strength of
170,000 soldiers.12
Arraigned against them was General von Falkenhausen’s Sixth
Army of 12 divisions and 1,016 artillery pieces. Falkenhausen had
divided his Army into five so-called “corps groups.” Two are of
immediate interest with regard to Vimy. Between Givenchy and
Loos, Falkenhausen sited General Georg Wichura’s “Group Souchez,”
composed of VIII Reserve Corps (56th Infantry Division, 80th
Reserve Division and 16th Bavarian Infantry Division). From St.
Laurent to Givenchy, Falkenhausen sited General Karl Ritter von
Fasbender’s “Group Vimy” composed of I Bavarian Reserve Corps
(1st Bavarian Reserve Division, 14th Bavarian Infantry Division
and 79th Prussian Reserve Division).13 Raw figures for the number
of divisions should not obscure the fact that Canadian divisions on
paper numbered about 19,700 ranks, while their German opposites
numbered but 11,600. As will be shown later, many of the German
   The overall strength of the Canadian Army in April 1917 was 17,802 officers and
283, 494 other ranks. See G. W. L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 19141919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Roge
Duhamel, 1962), 547.
13
   Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918.
Die militärischen Operationen zu Lande, vol. 12: Die Kriegführung im Frühjahr 1917
(Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1939), 210.
12
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divisions at Vimy had recently gone through the hell that was the
Somme.
A veteran of the Franco-Prussian War, General von Fasbender
had served as Chief of the Bavarian General Staff and had commanded
several infantry divisions before his retirement in 1912. Reactivated
at the start of the war, then Lieutenant-General von Fasbender led
I Bavarian Reserve Corps as it stormed through Douai and Lens
during the misnamed “race to the sea.” He marveled at the beauty of
the land: rich clover and beet fields, marvelous stone manor houses,
quaint villages.14 But around Lens, the landscape took on a less
attractive appearance: coal mines, slag heaps and industrial plants.
The closer the Reserve Corps came to Vimy, the more vicious became
the fighting. “The village battles are truly terrible,” Fasbender wrote
in his war diary. “We have to conquer the houses one by one, drag
the enemy out of cellars and sheds, or kill them by throwing handgrenades down at them.” And the greater became the destruction:
“All churches . . . are destroyed, all roofs torn off, walls caved in,
entire houses bared to the elements. People and animals lie about, the
barns are empty, cows roam about lowing; none are fed, watered or
milked because no one has remained in the village.”
On 6 October 1914 the I Bavarian Reserve Corps stormed Vimy
Ridge—where its advance was halted by Major-General Pétain’s
XXXIII French Corps. Ironically, Fasbender and his Corps would
return to Vimy Ridge in February 1917. It was not an enviable
command. Already in November 1914, Fasbender had noted: “This
campaign has developed into a sort of siege warfare, without really
being siege warfare and without us having the tools of siege warfare.”15
Nothing had changed by early 1917. Misery was the common
denominator for Germans and for Canadians alike that winter, which
turned out to have been the coldest of all four war winters.
◆

◆

◆

◆

Many of German Sixth Army’s infantry units had been hastily
summoned from the trenches of Artois and Flanders in February
and March 1917 in anticipation of the British assault at Arras.
   Karl Ritter von Fasbender, Kriegstagebuch, 3 and 5 October 1914, 12-14, 19,
Handschriften Sammlung 2212, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv-Kriegsarchiv, Munich.
15
   Ibid. Entry for 7 November 1914, 19.
14
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Lieutenant-General Roderich von Schoeler’s 11th Infantry Division,
for example, spent the summer and fall of 1916 in trench warfare
on the Somme. Lieutenant-General Otto von Rauchenberger’s 14th
Infantry Division was stood up only in August 1916 and immediately
deployed at Verdun; in November it was dispatched to the Somme.
Both of General von Fasbender’s Reserve units—Major-General
Ernst von Reuter’s 18th Reserve Division and Major-General
Theodor von Wundt’s 17th Reserve Division—spent the summer in
trench warfare on the Somme and the fall in similar conditions at
Ypres. Thus it is unsurprising that many of Sixth Army’s formations
were designated by the ohl as being “burned out,” “exhausted” and
“skeletal” after the Somme battles.
Of Fasbender’s three infantry divisions, five regiments were sited
on the narrow 700 to 1,000-metre-deep German strip at the top of
Vimy Ridge, 145 metres above the Douai Plain. They had been under
intense enemy artillery fire since February 1917, and in constant
rain that turned the shell craters and trenches into a quagmire.16
Conditions only deteriorated, as witnessed in countless soldiers’
diaries at the Bavarian Military Archive in Munich.17 Winter rains.
Fog. Sleet. Hail. Snow. Ice. Heavy enemy artillery bombardment.
Most of the men abandoned shelled-upon villages and slept in the
mud and snow of open fields. On the Ridge, the Germans faced
devastating torpedo mines. Endless tunneling. The metres-thick
walls of the trenches collapsed, often burying the men alive. Fat rats
ran across their sleeping bodies or feasted on the dead. The men’s
attempts to repeat the Christmas truces of the previous two years
were quashed by their officers. In January and February, I Bavarian
Reserve Corps daily noted dramatic increases in bombardments and
especially in Canadian patrols, sniper activity, and sapper tunneling.
The men were fatigued from hauling shells and trenching materials
up the Ridge. Nonetheless, Sixth Army headquarters reported the
Vimy divisions, “despite the effects of recent days,” to be “capable of
turning back a large assault.”18
Although one often reads of the vaunted German elastic defence
in depth at Vimy, this is not, in fact, the case. As already noted, the

   Der Weltkrieg, 211-12.
   The numerous diaries that I have consulted over the past two decades are in the
Handschriften Sammlung (HS) of the Bavarian Military Archive.
18
   Der Weltkrieg, 212.
16
17

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2016

9

Canadian Military History, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 16
10

‘The Battle-Fortune of Marshal Hindenburg’

A soldier amidst the ruins of the Arras-Lens front, ca. April-May 1917. [Bundesarchiv Bild

104-02757]

narrowness of the German position at the eastern edge of the Ridge
and the deep down-slope behind it allowed no such deployment, either
in depth or in elasticity. While some of the unit commanders had
spent the winter months in training centres around Sedan learning
the new defensive doctrines devised after the terrible months at the
Somme, those concepts were still new and untried. Many senior
front-line officers, foremost among them General von Falkenhausen
of Sixth Army, rejected the notion of elasticity and instead demanded
that the men hold every inch of territory—and if not, regain it by
counter-attack as soon as possible. Thus he anchored his defence on
immovable strong points and “hard” lines of resistance. At Vimy, he
set up three static defensive lines. The First Line on the Ridge was
500 metres deep and consisted of a network of trenches protected
by barbed-wire entanglements, elaborate redoubts, dug-outs, tunnels
and ancient caves dug into the chalk and sand, and some concrete
machine-gun emplacements. The Second Line, just below the crest
east of the Ridge, featured fortified dug-outs, underground shelters,
and more woven belts of wire. The Third Line, still farther east,
wound down the Douai Plain from Lens to Arras in front of the small
villages of Méricourt and Oppy and was studded with well-fortified
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positions.19 For our purposes, it is vital to remember that discussion,
disagreement and confusion about the new defensive system were
widespread among front-line commanders on the eve of the Battle of
Vimy Ridge.20
But what were the new defensive tactics? Officially titled
“Principles of Command for the Defensive Battle in Position Warfare,”
Captain Geyer’s blueprint called for a defence that featured both
depth and elasticity.21 The aim was “to husband one’s own forces”
while allowing the enemy to “exhaust himself and to bleed” heavily.
What Geyer called “machines of war” (artillery, trench mortars,
machine guns, flame throwers, and hand grenades) were to spare the
blood of soldiers, soon to be dubbed the “workers of war.” “Depth”
in the defensive system translated into abandoning the old linear
trench system roughly 2 kilometres deep in favor of a killing zone that
ranged between 9 and 12 kilometres in depth. Three lines of defence
were established and deployed much in the way as squares on a chess
board, each anchored on its own steel-reinforced concrete bunkers with
artillery and mortars. “Elasticity” was achieved by having the First
Line resist an enemy attack only as long as was feasible and then to
“evade” the main assault, drawing the adversary into a Second Line
battle zone dominated by machine-gun nests with interlocking zones
of fire. Third Line troops would, if need be, counterattack an invader
in small groups of combined arms units (storm troops). The new
doctrine of decentralization and individualization prescribed that the
division become king of the battlefield: it would combine and control
its own artillery, infantry, airpower, communications, and resupply. It
was elevated to near independent status and given control over all its
assets—land and air, men and material. And it was to man a front
of no more than 2,500 to 3,000 metres.
Reserve formations were critical. They were to be sited within
easy marching distance of the front lines, and they were to be

   For a good description, see Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 246; and
History of the Great War: Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, vol. I, pt.
1, The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battle of Arras, comp. by
Captain Cyril Falls (London: Imperial War Museum, 1992), 305.
20
   Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern, Mein Kriegstagebuch, ed. by Eugen von
Frauenholz (Munich: Deutscher National Verlag, 1929), vol. 2, entry for 9 October
1917.
21
   Hermann Geyer, Gesamteindrücke der Westreise, Januar 1917, Nachlass Hermann
Geyer, RH 61/924, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (hereafter BA-MA), Freiburg.
19
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trained in the new storm-troop tactics. Special three-month training
courses throughout the fall and winter of 1916 were to instil Geyer’s
new defensive warfare into commanders. But Ludendorff could not
quite go all the way: in the end, he insisted that the deployment of
Reserve formations and any decision to abandon battle land could be
requested by an Army Commander, but ordered only by the Army
Supreme Command.22 The Battle of Vimy Ridge would show the
error of his ways.
◆

◆

◆

◆

At 5:30 a.m. on Easter Monday, 9 April 1917, a British-Canadian
hurricane bombardment from some 900 guns and mortars rained
down on the German front line from Givenchy to Neuville-Vitasse,
defended by seven infantry divisions.23 Vimy Ridge itself, as stated
earlier, was held by five German regiments, with companies on average
down to but seventy-to-eighty men each. In all, according to the
British History of the Great War, the German regiments comprised
a rifle strength of about 5,000 men.24 At 6 a.m. wave after wave of
15,000 mostly Canadian infantrymen (equivalent to the entire 1911
population of Restigouche, New Brunswick) advanced under the fire
cover of a massive creeping barrage. Smoke shells and flamethrowers
went into action next. Lieutenant Gregory Clark, commanding 4th
Canadian Mounted Rifles’ 15 Platoon found it a thrilling experience.
“It was a beautiful sight. It was still quite dark. Sleet was falling.”
But it was also “the edge of hell. It blazed, flashed and flickered, the
bursting shells.” The soldiers advanced through “an infernal wall of
twisting, boiling smoke and flame.”25 The inadequacy of the German
defence mounted by Falkenhausen’s Group Vimy on the top of the
Ridge was soon revealed. British and Canadian high-explosive and
gas shells had killed many of the German draft animals and hence the
   The new defensive system has been superbly analyzed with reference to 11th
Bavarian Infantry Division by Christian Stachelbeck, Militärische Effektivität im
Ersten Weltkrieg. Die 11. Bayerische Infanteriedivision 1915 bis 1918 (Paderborn,
Munich, Vienna, Zurich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010), 169-71. Also, Bruce I.
Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918
(New York, Westport, London: Praeger, 1989).
23
   Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 252 ff.
24
   Falls, History of the Great War, 317.
25
   Cited in Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918
(Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008), 123.
22
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batteries on the Ridge quickly ran out of shells. No counter-battery
fire. No artillery to support a possible counter-attack. Moreover,
communications between the front and the rear echelon had been
blown to smithereens. The alternating rain, fog, clouds, and snow
prevented critical aerial spotting for the artillery.
The thin German line holding the eastern Ridge crumbled
quickly.26 Bavarian first and second lines were overrun in the first
hours of the assault. By 9 a.m., 14th Bavarian Infantry Division
had been driven off the Ridge down to the railroad embankment
at St. Laurent; in the words of the Bavarian Official History, the
Division consisted of “nothing but pitiful debris.”27 Thélus had to be
abandoned next. By 11 a.m., the right wing of 79th Prussian Reserve
Division had been thrown back to its Third Line in the valley; its left
wing to its Second Line; and its centre down the crest of the Ridge. As
the Canadians drove 14th Bavarian Infantry Division off the heights,
Fasbender’s position became untenable and he was forced to order
his I Bavarian Reserve Corps off the Ridge. The Germans lost the
commanding heights of Telegraph Hill at noon. One hour later Hill
93 (by the Point du Jure) was also in enemy hands. Major-General
Friedrich von Pechmann’s 1st Bavarian Reserve Division abandoned
Farbus by 1 p.m. and only halted its retreat east of the Ridge in its
Third Line at Vimy Village. The unit had lost 300 officers and 3,000
men that 9 April; it had abandoned thirty artillery pieces.28 It, along
with 14th Bavarian Infantry Division, would take the major blame for
the debacle at Vimy Ridge.
The only bright spots for the Germans on 9 April were but
two: that of the eight tanks that had accompanied 2nd Canadian
Division, three had been destroyed by gunfire and the rest stuck in
the sea of clay mud; and that once the skies had cleared, Manfred
von Richthofen (the Red Baron) scored kills 38 to 55 over and around
Vimy that “Bloody April.”29

   Given the near total destruction of German military records by Allied bombing
in April 1945, the best accounts remain with the official German and Bavarian
histories: Forschungsanstalt des Heeres, Der Weltkrieg, 212 ff.; and Bayerisches
Heeresarchiv, Die Bayern im Grossen Kriege 1914-1918, auf Grund der Kriegsakten
dargestellt (Munich: Verlag des Bayerischen Kriegsarchivs, 1923).
27
   Die Bayern im Grossen Kriege, 367.
28
   Ibid., 369.
29
   Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 213.
26
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The face of battle, as the historian John Keegan famously called
it, is well known and hence three diary entries, one Canadian, one
French and one German, might well serve our purpose. Private
Adelbert F. Brayman, 50th Battalion (Calgary) of the 4th Canadian
Division, was wounded storming Hill 145 at Vimy. He remembered
the ferocity of the battle:
From the very first minute of the attack we came under murderous and
hellish fire from the machine guns . . . we lost about 30 per cent of the
fighting forces before we got into [the enemy’s] green line of trenches and
went into hand-to-hand fighting. . . . As we looked back up that ridge
in the early dawn we witnessed a scene never to be forgotten. The entire
face of the hill was covered with German green and Canadian khaki.
Men lay out there in that blood-soaked field, some dead, some dying.30

A young French baker from Burgundy named René Jacob wrote his
parents from the battlefield near Soissons as follows:
How can one describe it? What words to use? Corpses everywhere.
Black and green corpses. Corpses in strange positions: a knee jutting up
into the air, or an arm resting against a trench wall. Corpses that one
has to cover with chalk or straw, or dirt and sand. The ground covered
with their entrails. Corpses that one buries or burns. A terrible smell,
a smell as from a charnel house, rises up and chokes us. . . . I spoke to
you earlier of a battlefield; no, it is more like a slaughter yard. Not even
the wind that blows across the Ridge can disperse the stench of death.31

On the German side of the Ridge at Giessler Heights, Hermann
Bauer with 14th Bavarian Infantry Regiment wrote home in much
the same vein:
Has all hell broke loose? An ear-splitting din and roar goes on unabated,
and already the first 15mm shell bursts into the south wall of the [sand]
pit. A trench wall collapses, but there is no time to think. . . . And the
[snow] flakes fall much like shell splinters. They tear all life into shreds.
We all suck in our breaths. . . . The Tommys have broken through.

   Cited in Cook, Shock Troops, 143.
   Cited in Michael Epkenhans, Der Erste Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Paderborn:
Ferdinand Schöningh, 2015), 91-92.
30
31

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss2/16

14

Herwig: “The Battle-Fortune of Marshal Hindenburg"
h e rw i g

15

The village of Oppy burns under artillery fire, May 1917. [Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1974-051-22]

Now, come on you Canadians! Suddenly they burst forth from Sand Pit
2; they disdain any ground cover, these Canadian storm troops. They
seem to believe that their hellish [artillery] fire has demoralized and
buried us.32

For German commanders, this was the immediate and obvious
question: what had gone so terribly wrong? First, the relatively
brief British-Canadian hurricane bombardment had caught them off
guard. Attacking after shelling the enemy for only four days had not
been the British way. Obviously, the enemy had also learned (and
applied) the lessons of the Somme. Second, the troops in the Second
Line of defence had been designated only as replacement forces for
the First Line; no one had thought of using them within hours of
an enemy assault to come to the rescue of that front line.33 Third,
German Reserve units had been held too far back from the fighting
front—in many cases as much as 20 kilometres—and thus could not
relieve the hard-pressed units up on the Ridge. Many still tarried in
the partly-finished Wotan (or Drocourt-Quéant) Line and, despite
the use of rail and motor transport, would not arrive at Vimy Ridge
   Das Bayernbuch vom Weltkriege 1914-1918. Ein Volksbuch, ed. by Konrad Krafft
von Dellmensingen (Stuttgart: Chr. Belser, 1930), 408-09.
33
   Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 214.
32
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Ludendorff. [Library of Congress LC-

B2- 5240-7]

until the next day. Too late to counter-attack. And finally, battlefield
conditions: darkness, a snow storm and the ubiquitous chalky mud
forced all operations to a halt on the night of 9 April.
On 10 April Lieutenant-General Karl Dieffenbach, commanding
Group Arras south of Vimy Ridge, sent a sobering report of the past
twenty-four hours to General Headquarters. “Situation unfavorable;
heavy losses; much artillery lost. Shell shortage. [Enemy] fire much
heavier than in the Battle of the Somme.”34 Telegraph Hill lost. Thélus
and Hills 93 and 94 in enemy hands. The 79th Reserve Division
had been badly knocked; 11th Infantry Division was being rushed
into theatre to take up position around Vimy. It would eventually
suffer 3,200 casualties there. Words such as “burned out,” “debris”
and “slag” were applied to many German formations in front-line
reports. Fasbender by late morning on 9 April had recommended a
5-kilometre withdrawal of his three divisions being ground off Vimy
Ridge to the line Méricourt-Arleux-Gavrelle. Falkenhausen and his
chief of staff, Major-General Karl von Nagel zu Aichberg, dismissed
the recommendation out of hand. Instead, they canvassed the
commanders of Groups Souchez, Vimy and Arras for their input—
   Ibid., 220.

34
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and then asked the ohl for permission for Sixth Army to launch
a counter-offensive against British forces around Arras. Ludendorff
passed the request on to Lieutenant-General Hermann von Kuhl,
Chief of Staff to Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria,
who quickly vetoed Falkenhausen’s plan, arguing that the Allies
would pre-empt and smash such an attack with a new offensive of
their own.35 Falkenhausen had no option but to bow to the obvious:
during the night of 12-13 April he ordered a total withdrawal of
German forces from Vimy to the line Lens-Avions-MéricourtAcheville-Arleux-Oppy, some 7 to 8 kilometres east of the Ridge and
part of the Siegfried Stellung south of Arras (Fasbender had made
that recommendation a day earlier!).
Rescue for the Bavarians came in several forms. First, the Allied
assault did not resume until 4 p.m. on 10 April. Second, by then,
reserves had begun to arrive at Vimy. The 18th Prussian Infantry
Division shored up the front of the badly knocked 14th Bavarian
Infantry Division; 17th Prussian Infantry Division that of 1st Bavarian
Reserve Division; and Prussian 11th Infantry Division that of 79th
Prussian Reserve Division. Defence of the last lines at Vimy Village
was secured by Major-General Arthur von Gabain’s 17th Prussian
Infantry Division36 (a bitter pill for the Bavarians to swallow!).
But if there was a hero on the German side, he was, in fact,
Bavarian: Karl von Fasbender. Almost 65 years of age in 1917, the
former retiree was still on top of his game. He had recognized the
British buildup around Arras and had warned the ohl of this five
days before the assault at Vimy Ridge. To no avail. He had recognized
the magnitude and the speed of the Canadian attack on the morning
of 9 April. To no avail. Well before noon that day he had counselled
a withdrawal to the Third Line along the railroad embankment at
Vimy Village. Again, to no avail. He had kept his reserves in the
line for as long as he could, and never blamed them for their defeat.
And from 14 April to 20 May 1917, he held the new German front
on the Douai Plain against ferocious Allied attacks emanating from
the heights of Vimy. In one of those rare moments in history where
valour is truly rewarded, Field Marshal Crown Prince Rupprecht
of Bavaria made certain that Fasbender received Bavaria’s highest
military honour, the Grand Cross of the Military Max-Joseph Order.
   Ibid., 225.
   Ibid., 222.
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◆

◆

◆

◆

General Ludendorff at once launched an investigation into the Vimy
debacle.37 There was no question that it had been a major defeat.
A complete surprise. An embarrassment. Seven divisions—mainly
those from Group Vimy and Group Souchez directly in the path
of the British-Canadian assault on 9 April—had been beaten so
soundly that they had to be relieved at once. As well, the right flank
of the Siegfried Stellung was exposed to British assault. The affected
divisions had lost 23,000 men, two-thirds euphemistically listed
as “missing.” And the major French blow on the Aisne was yet to
come! Ludendorff dispatched staff officers to Vimy and called theatre
commanders to his headquarters at Kreuznach for interrogation. How
to explain a bulge 18 kilometres wide and up to 6 kilometres deep
driven into the German line in just three days? Had the new Geyer/
Bauer defensive doctrine proved fallible? Had the officers not learned
the doctrine properly? Or had there been a failure of command?
Major-General Alfred Dieterich, commanding 79th Reserve
Infantry Brigade, later elucidated the tactical mistakes committed
at Vimy. The defensive First Line on top of the Ridge had been
“insufficiently planned,” with the most robust dug-outs sited
“mistakenly in the first line.” None were able to withstand the
withering British-Canadian artillery bombardments. And the Second
Line “was out of the question for a longer defence” because of its
“unfavourable position at the foot of the eastern slope.”38 Once the
Canadians had broken through the German First Line on 9 April, the
game was lost for Sixth Army.
It was time for lessons learned. On 13 April the ohl listed three
major causes of failure. First, several divisions had collapsed simply
because they had not yet regained their fighting strength from the
terrible Somme battles. Second, the reserves had not been called up
to the front lines in timely fashion. Third, sufficient artillery had not
been deployed against the enemy. After further study, Ludendorff
concluded that the two main causes of defeat had been the failure
to call up the reserves (especially those from the Second Line) once
the magnitude of the attack had been recognized, and the failure
   Ibid., 234.
   Alfred Dieterich, “The German 79th Reserve Infantry Division in the Battle of
Vimy Ridge, April 1917,” Canadian Military History: 15, 1 (2006), 72.
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Anti-aircraft guns during the battle of Arras, ca. April-May 1917. [Bundesarchiv Bild 183-

R41681]

to engage the heavy guns at once. (Comparatively speaking, each
battery of 10th Bavarian Artillery Regiment on 9 April had fired
roughly 1,500 shells.) Ludendorff ruled out failure on the part of the
soldiers: “The bravery of our troops remains firm.”39
But someone had to pay the price. Captain Geyer’s “Principles”
of December 1916 had been clear: “If something goes wrong, we will
arraign regimental commanders before courts-martial or dismiss
General Staff officers, even before replacements for them can be
found.”40 Thus, Ludendorff cashiered General von Falkenhausen
(going on age 73) as commander of Sixth Army and Major-General
von Nagel as chief of staff. They had failed to recognize the size, the
speed and the power of the British-Canadian attack, and thus had been
surprised and overrun at Vimy. Only a timely and early withdrawal
from the rain and snow-soaked Ridge, as advocated by General von
Fasbender, could have spared Sixth Army its ignominious defeat.
Ludendorff dispatched Falkenhausen to Brussels to command a desk

   Der Weltkrieg, 235. Ludendorff’s conclusions were based in large measure on the
findings of the new, hastily-appointed chief of staff of Sixth Army, Colonel Fritz von
Loßberg, his “lion of the defensive”. See Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914-1918,
(Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1939), 283-84, 288.
40
   Geyer, Abwehr, RH 61/924 262, BA-MA; and Stachelbeck, Militärische
Effektivität, 179.
39
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as Governor-General of occupied Belgium, and Nagel to Romania to
command a trench division on the Siret River.
The German Official History, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, went
further: it blamed the ohl equally for the debacle.41 There had been
failures. No one at headquarters had recognized the size of the enemy
deployment around Arras; only Fasbender, the I Bavarian Reserve
Corps commander at Vimy, had. The construction of the Siegfried
Stellung in that sector had led to a false sense of security. Heavy
batteries had been removed from Group Vimy for two weeks of rearechelon training. The power of the enemy assault—nearly twice as
many heavy guns and five times the amount of heavy shells expended
as on the first day of the Somme offensive on 1 July 1916—had come
as a total surprise. As late as 30 March, Ludendorff and his staff had
let it be known that the pending British attack was still two to three
weeks away. When they recognized their miscalculation on 5 April,
it was too late. While Captain Geyer’s new defensive doctrine proved
its value along the overall front, with specific reference to Vimy Ridge
the narrowness of the terrain (less than 1,000 metres) simply had
not allowed for an elastic defence in depth. And all too many units
had been taken out of Flanders and Artois too hastily and deployed
at Arras without proper rest and recuperation as well as retraining.
Left out in both the studies of the Third Army Supreme Command
and of the Official History were several systematic failings. The
reorganization of the Imperial German Army into new “army groups”
had caused massive confusion. Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht
of Bavaria, for example, made up of former Fourth, Sixth, First, and
Second Armies, had been set up (at least on paper) only on 1 March
1917. Many corps and divisions had been given new commanders,
and different regional formations (Bavarian, Prussian, Saxon,
Württemberg) had been haphazardly thrown together.42 Second, the
bold strategic withdrawal of troops to the Siegfried Stellung (ArrasSt Quentin-Soissons) had not begun until 16 March, three weeks
before the Arras offensive. Soldiers had been used as construction
workers and many had not yet returned to their units by 9 April. The

   Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 236-38.
   The standard work remains Hermann Cron, Geschichte des Deutschen Heeres im
Weltkriege 1914-1918 (Berlin: K. Siegismund, 1937); in English translation, Imperial
German Army, 1914-18: Organisation, Structure, Orders of Battle (Solihull, West
Midlands: Helion, 2002).
41
42
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Canadian assault thus struck at a time of critical reorganizational
chaos in the Reich’s military structure in the West.
Still, the German Official History concluded its analysis of the
Battle of Vimy Ridge with a positive spin. Whereas up to now enemy
gunners had known the precise German positions and thus had
been able to target them mercilessly, the withdrawal to the rolling
countryside east of the Ridge evened the score: now attacker and
defender alike had to deal with new and uncertain topographical
realities. Its final verdict: “Thus the significance of the great British
[sic] initial success in terms of the overall front remained operationally
limited to insignificant territorial gain.”43 The soldiers at Vimy in
1917, both Canadian and German, I suspect, would have had some
trouble with this verdict, penned in 1939.
◆

◆

◆

◆

The obvious question as always: why did the common soldier keep on
fighting? Research into this central issue has largely been neglected
in Germany. Military sociology, so studiously analyzed with regard
to “Fighting Power” especially in the United States after 1945,
remains the stepchild of German military history.44 Most writers
point to the obvious: patriotism, love of nation, honor of Kaiser and
Empire, defence of wife and child and hearth against an evil enemy.
Discipline. Following orders. Unit cohesion. Camaraderie. Hatred of
staff officers and headquarters. Pride in one’s self. Pride in one’s
particular region (in this case Bavaria). The hope that just one more
“push” would bring an end to the war. And the obvious rewards and
inducements: leave, special rations, commendations, medals, sexual
refreshment behind the lines. Also, as we know from Ernst Jünger’s
recently published unabridged memoirs, the liberal use of alcohol.45
And, what was the alternative to fighting on? Desertion had its
own dangers. Where to? To the South, the Swiss border was closed

   Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 239.
   A first comprehensive investigation stemmed from Hans Paul Bahrdt, Die
Gesellschaft und ihre Soldaten: Zur Soziologie des Militärs (Munich: C. H. Beck,
1987). It largely followed Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of
Soldiers in Battle (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982), commissioned by the Canadian
Department of National Defence.
45
   Ernst Jünger, Kriegstagebuch 1914-1918, ed. by Helmuth Kiesel (Stuttgart:
Klett- Cotta, 2010).
43
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and well guarded. To the East, rear-echelon patrols were only too
eager to sweep up deserters and send them to labour battalions.
And to the West, the enemy: running toward his lines with one’s
hands up in the air was no guarantee of survival. It never ceases to
amaze those of us who have for so long studied the Great War that
also at Vimy, morale held—even among Fasbender’s Bavarian weekend warriors. Like their Canadian regular army counterparts, they
endured the mud, the gas, the mines, the collapsing trench walls, the
snow, the sleet, the slaughter, and at times, the sheer boredom.
◆

◆

◆

◆

The Battle of Vimy Ridge was downplayed in contemporary German
official reports and newspapers as well as in subsequent accounts.
Field Marshal von Hindenburg in his memoirs, which in fact were
written by a staff officer with the Official History, spoke of 9 April
1917 as constituting “a dark picture, much shade, little light.” But,
he cheerily concluded, “what did losing a single position amount to
in this gigantic battle when compared to the victorious mastery of
the entire front?”46 General Ludendorff allowed that he was “deeply
depressed” that 9 April. It had ruined his 52nd birthday! But fortyeight hours later he casually wrote off the entire affair. “During the
night [from 11 to 12 April] we evacuated Vimy Ridge.”47
The German Official History, based on after-action reports that
were lost to the massive British air raid on the military archives
at Potsdam on 14 April 1945, gave no figures—killed, wounded,
deserted—for Vimy. Instead, using the army’s cold, clinical ten-day
casualty reports, it simply reported the loss by Sixth Army of 20,800
soldiers from 1 to 10 April, of 10,600 from 11 to 20 April, and of
19,800 from 21 to 30 April 1917—a total of 51,000 men against
78,000 “Tommys.” Thus, while lamenting the “great loss of prisoners,
equipment and territory” on 9 April, the officer-historians of the
Official History deemed the following three weeks to have constituted
“a total success for the German defence.”48

   Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben (Leizpig: S. Hirzel,
1929), 241-42.
47
   Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-1918, 334.
48
   Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918, 277.
46
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Newspapers at home were even more inventive. And invective.
Munich’s main paper, the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten,
trumpeted what quickly became the main line of argument: that the
Battle of Arras had been yet another “fight between the brainless
piling up of material [Haig] and the genius [Hindenburg] who inspires
his tools with his will and employs them according to his laws.” The
British “war machine,” the paper reminded its readers, was the last
resort of the coward, who in the face of superior morale and infallible
generalship could only seek to crush the enemy under a mass of steel
and explosives.49 It was a well-worn reiteration of the old “materialversus-morale” argument. The capital’s Berliner Tageblatt reported
only on the Battle of the Aisne: “One Of The Greatest Battles In
The History Of The World,” and one in which the attackers had
been beaten back. It also briefly noted what it called “Various Minor
Attacks Turned Away” elsewhere.50 So much for British First and
Third Armies. And so much for the Canadian Corps. In fact, only
the Frankfurter Zeitung paid even indirect attention to Vimy Ridge:
“The battle-fortune of Marshal [Hindenburg] is not bound up with
the possession of a hill.”51 Period.
The repeated references to the German overall “total success”
and to the “mastery of the entire front” in the West are revealing.
For, what did the loss “of a hill” mean in the grander scheme of the
Nivelle Offensive (the twin battles of the Champagne and Arras)?
Five Entente divisions had stormed Vimy Ridge, defended by three
German divisions; 53 French and British divisions later assaulted
the Aisne sector defended by 38 German divisions. Roughly 10,600
Canadians (including 3,600 killed) had bled at Vimy; some 134,000
poilus (including 30,000 killed) had paid the price for Nivelle’s folly
on the Aisne.52 At Vimy, Generals von Falkenhausen and von Nagel
had adamantly clung to the customary system of a rigid and static
defense; on the Aisne, Ludendorff adopted Captain Geyer’s concept
of the “Defensive Battle in Position Warfare.” Thus, the German
arguments ran, the debacle at Vimy Ridge was but one small side of
   http://hdp.daviesmeyer.com/Home/Deutsche-Geschichte-im-Spiegel-der-Presse/
Der-erste-Weltkrieg/1917, accessed 20 April 2016.
50
   Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung, 17 April 1917, 1.
51
   Cited in John Frank Williams, Corporal Hitler and the Great War 1914-1918:
The List Regiment (London, New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 166.
52
   Figures according to the French Historical Services; cited in Doughty, Pyrrhic
Victory, 334.
49
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German troops in the ruins of Givenchy. [Bundesarchiv Bild 146-2008-0066]

a much larger campaign; and it was easily dismissed as one of simple
human failure.
To be sure, the positive spin put on the Battle of Arras by the
German media is hardly surprising. The General Staff kept a tight
rein on information, issuing battle reports to but ten Austrian,
German and Hungarian reporters officially accredited to the ohl .
The safety of its front-line troops, the General Staff allowed, could
only be guaranteed by such strict control over information and
publication. One of the ohl’s most banal communiqués, Im Westen
nichts Neues (“In the West Nothing New”), of course became the
title of Erich Maria Remarque’s wildly famous war novel, with the
English-language title All Quiet on the Western Front (1928).
But what about the German Official History? Why the postwar
positive spin even on defeats? The answer lies in the origins of
the future Reichsarchiv, which eventually produced the fourteen
volumes of the official history of the war. In July 1919 Major-General
Hans von Seeckt, a brilliant operations officer and the founder of
the Reichswehr under the Weimar Republic, laid down the ground
rules for the Official History. First off, there were to be no “private
individuals” involved in the project—read, university professors such
as Hans Delbrück, Friedrich Meinecke and Hermann Oncken who
had been even mildly critical of the General Staff in the Great War.
After all, Seeckt reminded the Cabinet of Chancellor Gustav Bauer,
these mandarins “worked only for themselves,” and “only in a limited
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sense for the state, [and] often against it.” In the well-established
tradition of the Prussian General Staff, the Official History was to be
written completely by former and current officers. Ranks were closed,
reputations upheld. The “prestige” of the army was to be “protected
at all cost.” Finally, the “morally, psychologically and physically
broken Volk” needed to have faith in itself restored. That would
be the primary function of Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. It, and it
alone, Seeckt argued, could “revive the memories of the grand deeds
during the world war.”53 The tomes written and published after 1933,
beginning with volume 9, naturally had to pass National-Socialist
muster and constituted what the historian Markus Pöhlmann called
a “remilitarization” of the Official History project.54 The new elite
of Adolf Hitler’s Wehrmacht, men who had served at Verdun and
the Somme mostly in the rank of captain, were not to be exposed to
criticism of that epic war.
◆

◆

◆

◆

Finally, there remains one of history’s delicious “what-if” scenarios.
After his injury at the Somme in October 1916 and his two-month
recovery at home from a shrapnel wound in the upper leg (possibly
with the loss of one testicle), Adolf Hitler—by his own report—was
returned to his old unit the first week of March 1917, the 16th
Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment, often simply called the “List
Regiment” after its first commander, Colonel Julius von List. The
Regiment, badly shaken by the physical and psychological demands
of the Somme fighting, had been stationed in what was regarded
as a “quiet sector,” Vimy Ridge. Hitler arrived there the first week
of March 1917 to join his outfit. But then, in one of those strange
twists of history, the unit was inexplicably separated from its parent
formation, the 16th Bavarian Infantry Division at Givenchy, and
moved a dozen miles north to La Bassée, where the ohl expected

   Seeckt’s memorandum of 12 July 1919, Bundesarchiv-Berlin, R 1506 (Reichsarchiv),
Nr. 41, 101-07. Cited in Markus Pöhlmann, Kriegsgeschichte und Geschichtspolitik:
der Erste Weltkrieg. Die amtliche deutsche Militärgeschichtsschreibuung 1914-1956
(Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2002), 70-71. Italics in the original.
54
   Ibid., 151 ff.
53
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the main British attack.55 Had the relocation of the 16th Bavarian
Reserve Infantry Regiment not taken place, or had it been delayed by
even four weeks, the men of the Canadian Corps might have spared
the world the horrors of a second world war and the Holocaust.
◆

◆

◆

◆
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